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Is it possible to get local indeterminacy of equilibria in a growth model
with a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ? This is
the central question raised in this paper. Considering a two-sector innite-
horizon model with sector-specic externalities, we have proved in Garnier,
Nishimura and Venditti [13, 14] that, when additively separable preferences
are assumed, the answer is necessarily negative. In this paper, we consider
instead non-separable preferences, and we provide a positive answer giving
some sucient conditions based on the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure.
One may wonder why such a question has some importance. A wide-
spread perception among economists is that macroeconomic business-cycle

uctuations can be driven by changes in expectations about fundamentals.
A major strand of the literature focussing on 
uctuations derived from
agents' beliefs is based on the concept of sunspot equilibria that dates back
to the early works of Shell [35], Azariadis [1] and Cass and Shell [12]. As
shown by Woodford [37], the existence of sunspot equilibria is closely related
to the indeterminacy of perfect foresight equilibrium, i.e. the existence of
a continuum of equilibrium paths converging toward one steady state from
the same initial value of the state variable.
During the last decade a variety of economic models that incorporate
some degree of market imperfections have been shown to exhibit multiple
equilibria and local indeterminacy.1 Following the seminal contribution of
Benhabib and Farmer [4], innite horizon Ramsey-type models augmented
to include external eects in production have been widely studied. Within
aggregate formulations with economy-wide externalities and increasing re-
turns at the social level, the results fundamentaly depend on the speci-
cations of preferences, being additively separable or non separable, and
technology, being with a unitary or non-unitary elasticity of capital-labor
substitution. However, for all these dierent formulations, a large enough
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, a close to innity
wage elasticity of the labor supply and some strictly positive but not too
large income eects are clearly central conditions.2
1See Benhabib and Farmer [6] for an extensive bibliography.
2See Guo and Lansing [18], Meng and Yip [26], Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [29],
Pintus [33] for conclusions based on additively separable preferences, and Bennett and
Farmer [9], Hintermaier [20, 21], Jaimovich [22], Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti [25],
Meng and Yip [26], Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [29], Pintus [34] for conclusions based
1Within two-sector formulations with sector-specic externalities, the lit-
erature has only focused on additively separable preferences,3 and has split-
ted between models with increasing returns at the social level derived from
Benhabib and Farmer [5], and models with constant returns at the social
social level derived from Benhabib and Nishimura [8]. Although a large
enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is still a cen-
tral condition for the existence of indeterminacy for all these formulations,
the restrictions on the labor supply are quite dierent depending on the re-
turns to scale at the social level:4 a close to innity wage elasticity of labor
is usually assumed under increasing social returns,5 but a close to zero wage
elasticity appears to be a necessary condition under constant social returns.6
When we look at empirical evidence, on the one hand, the elasticity
of the aggregate labor supply is shown to be signicantly lower than one,7
but on the other hand, while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption is usually shown to be low, recent estimates provide divergent
views. In a rst set of contributions, Campbell [11] and Kocherlakota [24]
suggest the interval (0:2;0:8). More recently, Vissing-Jorgensen [36] partially
conrmed such ndings by showing that the estimates of this elasticity are
around 0:3   0:4 for stockholders and around 0:8   1 for bondholders, and
are higher for households with larger asset holdings within these two groups.
On the contrary, in a second set of contributions, Mulligan [28] repeatedly
obtained estimates above unity, i.e. in the range 1:1   2:1, using dierent
estimation methods. The upper part of this interval has been recently con-
rmed by Gruber [16] who provides robust estimates of the elasticity around
2.8
While two-sector models with constant social returns provide restrictions
on non-separable preferences.
3One notable exception if provided by Mino [27] who considers a non-separable utility
function within a two-sector Lucas-type endogenous growth model with human capital
aggregate externalities. He also shows that local indeterminacy occurs when the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is large enough.
4Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [14] show that such a dierence precisely relies on
the amount of social returns to scale in the investment good sector.
5See Benhabib and Farmer [5], Harrison [19]
6See Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [13], Nishimura and Venditti [32].
7Most econometric analysis available in the literature conclude that the wage elasticity
of labor belongs to (0;0:3) for men and to (0:5;1) for women (see Blundell and MaCurdy
[10]).
8Barro [2] uses the Gruber's estimates to evaluate the welfare costs of rare disasters in
a representative-consumer model.
2on the labor supply that t these evidence, this is not the case for the condi-
tions on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution which is usually required
to be close to innity. Our aim in this paper is then to provide conditions
for local indeterminacy which are consistent with these two sets of empiri-
cal facts by focussing on non-separable utility functions. We will show that
the existence of multiple equilibria can be compatible with a low elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution in consumption provided the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure is adequately chosen.
Our strategy is the following. In order to get local indeterminacy with-
out requiring a large intertemporal substitutability of consumption, we look
for a mechanism which is based on the demand for leisure. Indeed, if the
reaction of leisure following some modication of consumption is such that
the current level of utility remains almost constant, there is no need to re-
quire any additional restriction on the intertemporal substitution properties
of the utility function. This crucially depends however on the relationship
between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and the
wage elasticity of the labor supply (or leisure). When additively separable
preferences are considered, these two elasticities are not connected and the
previous mechanism cannot occur. We will show however that when non-
separable preferences are considered, this is no longer true and the above-
mentioned mechanism can be obtained from the explicit consideration of the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
We consider a continuous-time two-sector innite-horizon model with
sector-specic externalities. The production side is dened on the basis of
Cobb-Douglas production functions.9 The preference side is dened on the
basis of a concave homogeneous non-separable utility function for which the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure depends on
their ratio. We build our analysis on a capital intensity reversal between
the private and the social levels, the consumption good sector being capital
intensive at the private level but labor intensive at the social level.10 We
show that local indeterminacy arises for any given low elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption provided the wage elasticity of the labor
supply and the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
are low enough.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section sets up the basic
9CES technologies can be equivalently considered but at the cost of heavier notations
(see Nishimura and Venditti [31] and Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [13]).
10See Benhabib and Nishimura [8] and Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [13] in which
these conditions are shown to be necessary for local indeterminacy.
3model, denes the intertemporal equilibrium and proves the existence of a
steady state. In section 3 we state our main results and we provide economic
intuitions in section 4. Section 5 nally contains concluding comments and
all the proofs are in a nal Appendix.
2 The model
We consider the same basic framework of a two-sector innite-horizon model
with sector-specic externalities as in Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [13,
14]. But instead of assuming additively separable preferences, we will con-
sider a non-separable utility function.
2.1 Technologies
We consider an economy producing a consumption good y0 and a capital
good y1. Each good is produced by capital x1j and labor x0j, j = 0;1,
through a Cobb-Douglas production function which contains sector specic-
externalities. The representative rm in each industry indeed faces the fol-





1j ej(X0j;X1j); j = 0;1 (1)






with bij  0 and Xij denoting the average use of input i in sector j. We
assume that these economy-wide averages are taken as given by each indi-
vidual rm. At the equilibrium, since all rms of sector j are identical, we






with ^ ij = ij + bij and ^ 0j + ^ 1j = 1, j = 0;1.
Choosing the consumption good as the numeraire, i.e. p0 = 1, a rm in
each industry maximizes its prot given the price of the investment (capital)
good p1, the rental rate of capital w1 and the wage rate w0. The rst order
conditions subject to the private technologies (1) give
xij=yj = pjij=wi  aij(wi;pj); i;j = 0;1 (3)
We call aij the input coecients from the private viewpoint.
Considering that total labor is given by ` = x00+x01, and the total stock
of capital is given by x1 = x10 + x11, the factor market clearing equation
4is directly obtained from the private input coecients as dened by (3).
Denoting x = (`;x1)0, y = (y0;y1)0 and A(w;p) = [aij(wi;pj)], we get
A(w;p)y = x (4)
Let us now dene
^ aij(wi;pj)  (^ ij=ij)aij(wi;pj) (5)
From (3) we get xij = (pjij=wi)yj. Substituting this expression into the so-
cial production functions (2) and solving with respect to pj gives the factor-
price frontier, which provides a relationship between input prices and output
prices. Denoting p = (1;p1)0, w = (w0;w1)0 and ^ A(w;p) = [^ aij(wi;pj)], we
get
p = ^ A0(w;p)w (6)
We call ^ aij the input coecients from the social viewpoint.11
Note from (4) and (6) that at the equilibrium, the wage rate and the
rental rate are functions of the price of the capital good only, i.e. wi =
wi(p1), i = 0;1, while outputs are functions of the capital stock, total labor
and the price of the capital good, yj = ~ yj(x1;`;p1), j = 0;1.
Considering the external eects (e0;e1) as given, prot maximization in
both sectors gives demands for capital and labor as functions of the capital
stock, the output of the investment good, total labor and the external eects,
namely ~ xij = xij(x1;y1;`;e0;e1), i;j = 0;1. The production frontier is then





From the envelope theorem we easily get w1 = T1(x1;y1;`;e0;e1), p1 =
 T2(x1;y1;`;e0;e1) and w0 = T3(x1;y1;`;e0;e1).
2.2 Preferences
The economy is populated by a large number of identical innitely-lived
agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population
is constant and normalized to one. At each period a representative agent
supplies elastically an amount of labor ` 2 (0;  `), with  ` > 0 his endowment
of labor. He derives utility from consumption c and leisure L =  `   `
according to a non-separable function U(c;L) which satises:
Assumption 1. U(c;L) is Cr over R+[0;`] for r  2, increasing in each
argument, concave, homogeneous of degree 
 2 (0;1], and for all (c;L) 2 R2
+,
limc=L!0 U2(c;L)=U1(c;L) = 0 and limc=L!+1 U2(c;L)=U1(c;L) = +1.
11If the agents take account of externalities as endogenous variables in prot maximiza-
tion, the rst order conditions subject to the social technologies (2) give the same input
coecients from the social viewpoint.
5Consumption and leisure are then normal goods. Building on the homo-
geneity of degree 
 2 (0;1], we introduce the share of consumption within
total utility (c;L) 2 (0;





The share of leisure within total utility is similarly dened as 
   (c;L) 2
(0;
).12
Considering that consumption at time t is given by the output of the
consumption good sector, i.e. ct = y0t as dened by (7), the intertemporal





U(T(x1(t);y1(t);`(t);e0(t);e1(t));  `   `(t))e tdt
s:t: _ x1(t) = y1(t)   gx1(t)
x1(0) given
fej(t)gt0; j = 0;1; given
(9)
where   0 is the discount rate and g > 0 is the depreciation rate of the
capital stock.
2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium and steady state
The modied Hamiltonian in current value is given by:
H = U(T(x1(t);y1(t);`(t);e0(t);e1(t));  `   `(t)) + q1(t)(y1(t)   gx1(t))
with q1(t) the co-state variable which corresponds to the utility price of the
capital good in current value. The rst order conditions of problem (9) are
given by the following equations:
q1(t) = p1(t)U1(c(t);  `   `(t)) (10)
U2(c(t);  `   `(t)) = w0U1(c(t);  `   `(t)) (11)
_ x1(t) = y1(t)   gx1(t) (12)
_ q1(t) = ( + g)q1(t)   w1(t)U1(c(t);  `   `(t)) (13)
As shown in Section 2.1, we have wi = wi(p1), i = 0;1, y1 = ~ y1(x1;`;p1) and
c = ~ y0(x1;`;p1) = T(x1; ~ y1(x1;`;p1);`;e0(x1;`;p1);e1(x1;`;p1)). Therefore,
solving equation (11) describing the labor-leisure trade-o at the equilib-
rium, we express the labor supply as a function of the capital stock and the
12This result is derived from the standard Euler equality for homogeneous functions,
namely 
U(c;L) = U1(c;L)c + U2(c;L)L.
6output price, ` = `(x1;p1). Then, we get y0 = c(x1;p1)  ~ y0(x1;`(x1;p1);p1)
and y1 = y1(x1;p1)  ~ y1(x1;`(x1;p1);p1).
Let us introduce the following elasticities:
cc =  
U1(c;L)
U11(c;L)c; Lc =  
U2(c;L)
U21(c;L)c; cL =  
U1(c;L)
U12(c;L)L; LL =  
U2(c;L)
U22(c;L)L;
As it will be more convenient to write the linearized dynamical system in
terms of elasticities with respect to labor, let ~ U(c;`)  U(c;  `   `). We get
~ U2(c;`) =  U2(c;L), ~ U12(c;`) =  U12(c;L), ~ U22(c;`) = U22(c;L) and thus:
`c =  
~ U2
~ U21c = Lc; c` =  
~ U1
~ U12` =  cL
 ` `
` ; `` =  
~ U2
~ U22` =  LL
 ` `
` (14)
Note that since ~ U(c;`) is decreasing and concave with respect to `, the
elasticity `` is negative.
Considering (10)-(13), the equations of motion are nally derived as






























Note that E(x1;p1) is equal to 1 minus the sum of the ratio of the elasticity
of the consumption good's output with respect to the price of the investment
good over the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, and
the ratio of the elasticity of the aggregate labor supply with respect to the
price of the investment good over the elasticity of the consumption marginal
utility with respect to labor.
Any solution fx1(t);p1(t)gt0 that satises the transversality condition
lim
t!+1
e tU1(c(t);  `   `(t))p1(t)x1(t) = 0 (17)
is called an equilibrium path.
A steady state is dened by a pair (x
1;p
1) solution of
y1(x1;p1) = gx1; w1(p1) = ( + g)p1 (18)
Existence and uniqueness easily follows:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 there exists a unique steady state
(x
1;p
1) > 0 with ` = `(x
1;p
1) 2 (0;  `).
In order to simplify the analysis, we will consider a normalization of the
steady state and choose a particular value for the stationary labor supply.
Considering the share of consumption within total utility as dened by (8),
the rst order condition (11) evaluated at the steady state becomes
7`
 ` ` = 
(
 ) (19)
with  = =w0 and , w0 as given in Appendix 6.1. Hence, choosing
























































All these partial derivatives are functions of cc, c`, `c and ``. The role of
`c and `` of course occurs through the presence of endogenous labor but
remains implicit at that stage mainly because of our methodology to derive
the dynamical system (15) from the rst order conditions (10)-(13).
Any solution of (15) that converges to the steady state (x
1;p
1) satises
the transversality condition (17) and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given
x1(0), if there is more than one initial price p1(0) in the stable manifold of
(x
1;p
1), the equilibrium path from x1(0) will not be unique. In particular,
if J has two eigenvalues with negative real parts, there will be a continuum
of converging paths and thus a continuum of equilibria.





1) is locally indeterminate.
The eigenvalues of J are given by the roots of the characteristic polynomial























































Local indeterminacy requires therefore that D > 0 and T < 0.
83 Local indeterminacy with low intertemporal sub-
stitutability
Our aim is to give conditions for the occurrence of local indeterminacy. As
initiated by Benhabib and Nishimura [8], these conditions will be based
on capital intensity dierences across sectors. Using the input coecients
dened in Section 2.1 allows indeed to give the following characterization:
Denition 2. The consumption good is capital intensive at the private
level if and only if a11a00   a10a01  T < 0, and capital intensive at the
social level if and only if ^ a11^ a00   ^ a10^ a01  ^ T < 0.
From the rst order conditions given in Appendix 6.1, we can conveniently
relate these input coecients to the Cobb-Douglas parameters. At the
steady state:
i) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive at the private level
if and only if
b  1  
1001
0011 < (>)0
ii) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive at the social level if
and only if
^ b  1  
^ 10 ^ 01
^ 00 ^ 11
< (>)0
Using the Euler theorem for a homogeneous of degree 
 2 (0;1] utility
function, we get U12 = (
   1)U1=L   (c=L)U11 and U22 = (1   
)(U1c  














)cc < 0 (22)









 )2cc  0 (23)
Note that (23) and thus `` < 0 in (22) hold if cc  
=(1   
).
Following Benhabib and Nishimura [8], we focus on a conguration with
a factor intensity reversal between the private and the social levels in which
the consumption good is capital intensive at the private level (b < 0) but
labor intensive at the social level (^ b > 0). The next Proposition shows that
a continuum of equilibria arises if the utility function is not too concave and
the share  of consumption in total utility is large enough.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, let b < 0 and ^ b > 0. Then there exist

 2 (0;1) and  2 (0;
) such that when 
 2 (
;1] and  2 (;
), the steady
state is locally indeterminate.
9As the expression 1 
 provides a measure of the degree of concavity of the
utility function, we get the usual conclusion that local indeterminacy arises
if this degree is close enough to zero, i.e. if 
 is close enough to one. Note
also that the condition on the share  implies to consider a low elasticity
of the labor supply as in the case with additively-separable preferences (see
Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [13]). Indeed, we easily compute from (11),














)] > 0 (24)
It follows that when  is close to 
, "`w is close to zero.
As explained in the introduction, most of the contributions in the litera-
ture show that local indeterminacy usually needs a large enough elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption cc. The question is now to know
whether for a given low value of cc that would match empirical evidence,
we are able to choose a value of  which is close enough to 
 to satisfy the
condition of Proposition 2. Actually, the answer is not obvious as cc and 
are linked through the elasticity of substitution between consumption and














Obviously, if the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e. U(c;L) = cL with
+ = 
, then  = 1 and for any 
 2 (0;1], we get cc = 1=(1 ). Therefore
choosing  close to 
, which is itself close to 1, implies to choose cc large
enough, i.e. larger than 1. In this case local indeterminacy is still obtained
under a large elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. On
the contrary, when  is dierent from 1, for a given low value of cc and a
value of  close enough to 
, we can always choose  to satisfy equation
(26). As documented for instance in Campbell [11] and Kocherlakota [24],
plausible values of cc belong to the interval (0;1). We have then proved:
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, let b < 0, ^ b > 0 and consider the
critical bounds 
 2 (0;1) and  2 (0;
) as introduced in Proposition 2.
When 
 2 (
;1] and  2 ( ;
), for any given cc 2 (0;1), the steady state
is locally indeterminate if  =   cc(
   )=[
   cc(1   
)] < 1.
10We show that with concave homogeneous preferences, for any given low
value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, there
always exists a low enough value of the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure such that local indeterminacy occurs. Note that
the lower cc is, the lower  must be as @=@cc > 0. Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1 then prove that the occurrence of local indeterminacy is com-
patible with empirically plausible values for the fundamental parameters of
preferences. However, it remains now to know which kind of values for the
elasticity  of substitution between consumption and leisure is empirically
relevant. Up to our knowledge, there does not exist in the literature any
precise evaluation of this parameter. However, we can show that  is closely
linked with the income eects of preferences. Indeed we derive from (11),







For a given wage elasticity of labor "`w, the lower  is, the larger are the
income eects. Corollary 1 thus proves that local indeterminacy can arise
with any low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption pro-
vided the income eects are large enough. Such a conclusion is similar to
the one obtained in one-sector model where income eects have been shown
to be necessary for the occurrence of local indeterminacy.13
Remark: Other formulations of preferences
Two other specications of non-separable preferences are often used in the
business cycle and growth literature:




which is compatible with both balanced growth and stationary worked hours.
Denoting h(L) = v0(L)=v(L) and
 (L) = Lh(L); (L) =
Lh0(L)
h(L) (28)
Assumption 1 holds if v(L) is a positive increasing function,   0, (L) 
  (L)(1   ) and (L)   (L)(1   1=).14 Moreover, consumption and
leisure are normal goods. Note that  (L) > 0 can be interpreted as the
elasticity of the utility of leisure and (L) < 0 is linked to the elasticity of the
labor supply with respect to the wage rate `w, namely (L) =  L=(``w).15
13See Jaimovich [22], Meng and Yip [26].
14See Hintermaier [20, 21] and Pintus [34].
15This expression is obtained from the total dierenciation of equation (11).
11As the marginal rate of substitution is given by  (L)c=L, the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure is at the NSS:
 =  1= = `w`=L (29)




` =  "`w =  L=` (30)
ii) A Greenwood-Hercovitz-Human [15] (GHH) formulation such that
U(c;L) = u(c + G(L=B)) (31)
with u(:) and G(:) some increasing and strictly concave functions, and B >
0 a normalization constant. Such a specication is concave, satises the
normality assumption, and implies that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure depends on the latter only as
U2(c;L)
U1(c;L) = G0(L=B)=B




` = 0 (32)
and thus that there is no income eect associated with the representative




G00(L=B)(L=B) > 0 (33)
the elasticity of G(L=B) which also gives the elasticity of the labor supply
with respect to the wage rate as `w = G
LLL=`. As the marginal rate of
substitution is given by G0(L), the elasticity of substitution between con-





We show in Appendix 6.3 and 6.4 that when a KPR or a GHH utility
function is considered, local indeterminacy can also arise.16 However, even
if the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is arbitrar-
ily close to zero, the existence of local indeterminacy still requires a large
enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. An impor-
tant question is then to understand why such a dierence with respect to
16Guo and Harrison [17] have independently proved in a recent paper that local indeter-
minacy can arise in a two-sector model with sector-specic externalities, increasing social
returns and a GHH utility function, provided a low enough wage elasticity of the labor
supply is considered. However, they assume increasing returns larger than 30% and they
do not provide any information about the required elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption.
12the concave homogeneous specication occurs. The reason is simple and
relies on the link between the elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure , the elasticity of the labor supply `w and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption cc. Considering (29) and (34),
we conclude that in both cases  and `w remain in general disconnected
from cc. It follows that contrary to the conclusion derived from (26), low
values for  and `w do not imply a low value for cc. Put dierently, we
can also conclude from (30) and (32) that KPR and GHH preferences with
a low intertemporal substitutability do not generate enough income eects
to allow the existence of local indeterminacy.
A CES example:
As an illustration, consider a CES hmogeneous of degree 
 2 (0;1] utility
function such that U(c;L) = [c +(1 )L ] 
= with  2 (0;1),  >  1
and  = 1=(1 + ) the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure. In order to simplify the exposition, let us assume 
 = 1. From the
rst order condition (11) we derive c=L = [w0=(1   )] and the share of







Obviously, there exists a bound  2 (0;1) such that the condition  2
(;1) of Proposition 2 is satised if  2 (;1). Moreover, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is given by
cc =
+(1 )(c=L)
(1+)(1 )(c=L) or equivalently cc = 1
(1 )(1+) (36)
It follows that for a given  2 (;1), local indeterminacy arises with any
cc < 1 if  = [1   cc(1   )]=cc(1   ).
Let us then consider parameters' values that match quarterly data:  =
2:5%,  = 0:010252, 00 = 0:67, 10 = 0:33, 01 = 0:19, 11 = 0:66,
b01 = 0:15 and b00 = b10 = b11 = 0. We get b < 0 and ^ b > 0 with 15% of
externalities in the investment good sector, an amount that belongs to the
bounds provided by Basu and Fernald [3]. Considering rst an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption cc = 0:5 in the range provided
by Campbell [11] and Kocherlakota [24], we nd that the steady state is
locally indeterminate for any  2 (0:6773618;1). When  = 0:6774, this
conclusion holds with an elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure  = 0:1613 and a wage elasticity of labor `w = 0:45%.17 Considering
17Note that this value belongs to the lower ranges of estimated wage elasticities for men,
namely the interval (0;8%) (see Blundell and MaCurdy [10]).
13now an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption cc = 2 as
recently suggested by Gruber [16], we nd again that the steady state is
locally indeterminate for any  2 (0:6773618;1). When  = 0:6774, this
conclusion holds with an elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure  = 0:6452 and a wage elasticity of labor `w = 1:8%.
With other preferences and the same values for the technological pa-
rameters, the conclusions are drastically dierent. In the case of a KPR
utility function, if we set the wage elasticity of labor at `w = 1:8%, we nd
that local indeterminacy arises if cc > 4:25 while if `w = 0:45% we get
cc > 13:95. The results are even worse with a GHH utility function. In-
deed, we nd that local indeterminacy arises if cc > 4944 when `w = 1:8%,
or cc > 4920 when `w = 0:45% ! To complete the comparisons, we can also
consider an additively separable utility function with 1=c` = 1=`c = 0 and
constant elasticities of intertemporal substitution in consumption and of the
labor supply. We nd similarly that local indeterminacy arises if cc > 4935
when `w = 1:8%, or cc > 4918 when `w = 0:45%.
4 Economic intuitions
To understand the intuition for the existence of local indeterminacy, it is
convenient to refer to the consequences of multiple equilibria in terms of
business-cycles, namely the occurrence of expectation-driven 
uctuations.
In two-sector models with sector-specic externalities, constant social re-
turns and additively separable preferences, this intuition is now well estab-
lished. The basic conditions concern the technological side. Let us start
from an arbitrary equilibrium, and assume that agents expect an increase in
the rate of investment induced by an instantaneous increase in the relative
price of the investment good. On the one hand, a higher investment rate
results in higher stocks and, when the investment good is labor intensive at
the private level, an increase in the capital stock decreases its output at con-
stant prices through the Rybczynski eect. This mechanism thus generates
oscillations of the capital stock.18 On the other hand, when the investment
good is capital intensive at the social level, the initial rise in its price causes
through the Stolper Samuelson theorem an increase in its return w1 and
requires a price decline to maintain the overall return to capital equal to the
discount rate. This osets the initial rise in the relative price of the invest-
18See Benhabib and Nishimura [7].
14ment good and prices also reverse direction toward the steady state. As a
result, the transversality condition holds and the expected new equilibrium
becomes self-fullling.
But the properties of preferences also matter: On the one hand, when we
consider constructing an alternative equilibrium with a higher investment
rate, we must initially curtail consumption. If there is some curvature on the
utility function, the desire to smooth consumption over time can overwhelm
the technological eects described above. It follows that the associated 
uc-
tuations in consumption along the equilibrium path require a high enough
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption in order for the rep-
resentative agent to compensate current loss of consumption by future gain.
On the other hand, a low elasticity of labor supply is necessary to prevent
the agent from smoothing the 
uctuations in his wage and capital incomes
associated with the 
uctuations in the capital stock.19 When the utility
function is additively separable, these two elasticities are independent and
both restrictions are necessary for the existence of local indeterminacy.20
Consider now non-separable preferences. While the technological side
of the mechanism is identical to the previous one, local indeterminacy can
be obtained under less stringent conditions on the side of preferences when
concave homogeneous preferences are considered. Indeed, the level of utility
essentially depends on the consumption-leisure ratio c=L. When the elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption and leisure  is suciently less
than 1, consumption and leisure are complement. It follows that, when
the degree of concavity 1   
 is close enough to zero, if consumption falls,
leisure also falls in a similar proportion and the ratio c=L remains almost
constant. Moreover, considering a share  of consumption in total utility
close enough to 
 implies a low share 
    of leisure in total utility. As
a result, this mechanism implies weak variation of utility, and a decrease
of consumption today does not need to be compensated by a large increase
tomorrow. Expectation-driven 
uctuations then become compatible with a
low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
19When the labor supply is highly elastic, 
uctuations in the wage rate and the rental
rate of capital can be compensated for by major modications in the labor supply. The

uctuations in income are thus smoothed and the business-cycles can be eliminated. Con-
versely, when the labor supply is not very elastic, 
uctuations in the capital stock generate

uctuations in incomes and business cycles become persistent.
20See Nishimura, Garnier and Venditti [13].
155 Concluding comments
In this paper we have studied a continuous-time two-sector innite-horizon
model with Cobb-Douglas technologies augmented to include sector-specic
externalities. We have shown that when a concave homogeneous utility
function is considered, local indeterminacy arises with a low elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption provided the wage elasticity of
the labor supply and the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure are low enough. This result proves that contrary to the case
with additively-separable preferences, local indeterminacy becomes compat-
ible with intertemporal substitutability properties consistent with empirical
estimates.
The analysis provided in this paper could be extended following two
dierent lines of research. First, as homothetic utility functions are compat-
ible with endogenous growth, we could consider a Lucas-type version of our
model with human capital aggregate externalities. The same kind of argu-
ment could be used to prove that local indeterminacy of balanced-growth
paths can arise with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Second, we could also extend our analysis to the consideration of a two-
country general equilibrium model. Indeed, Nishimura and Shimomura [30]
have shown that indeterminacy can arise in a simple competitive two-country
dynamic model of international trade, free of externalities, imperfect com-
petition, and government intervention when there is no international credit
market. They use however a non standard quadratic utility function. Con-
sidering a non-separable formulation should allow to prove local indetermi-
nacy under weaker conditions on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
All this is left for future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Maximizing prot subject to the private technologies (1) gives the rst order
conditions
pjijyj=xij = wi; i;j = 0;1 (37)






























































































^ 01  ` (42)
Consider now (11) which can be written as follows
U2(`; ` `)
U1(`; ` `)  g(`) = w0 (43)
Under Assumption 1, lim`!0 g(`) = 0 and lim`! ` g(`) = +1 with g0(`) > 0,
and there exists a unique steady state with x
1 = ` and ` 2 (0;  `).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by the computation of D and T using a general formulation for
U(c;L). Let us rst introduce a useful relationship between `c and c`.21
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then at the steady state
c` =  

w0`c   `c (44)
with  and w0 as given by (41) in Appendix 6.1.
21A similar relationship has been obtained by Hintermaier [20].
17Proof : Using (14) and the rst order conditions (11), we get c` =  `c(c=w0`).
At the steady state we have c = ` and the result follows.
Consider the expressions (21). We need to compute the following seven
derivatives: @c=@x1, @c=@p1, @y1=@x1, @y1=@p1, @w1=@p1, @`=@x1 and @`=@p1.
Total dierenciation of the factor-price frontier (6) and the factor market
clearing equation (4) gives:
dw1
dp1 = ^ a00
^ a11^ a00 ^ a10^ a01 (45)
dc





































As ^ b < 1, the sign of Z1, Z2 and A is given by the sign of ^ b. We have nally
























































When dx1 = 0, consider the factor-price frontier (6). Solving for w0 gives:
w0 =
^ a10p1A
^ a11^ a00 ^ a10^ a01 (52)



































Let us denote T = (a11a00 a10a01) and ^ T = (^ a11^ a00 ^ a10^ a01). Substituting







































































































































with Z1 +Z2 > . Note that concavity and normality of consumption and
leisure imply 1=cc``  1=`cc`  0, 1=cc  1=`c  0 and 1=c`  1=``  0.
Let us now prove Proposition 2 by focusing on a concave homogeneous
of degree 
























































































































with  = =w0 and , w0 given in Appendix 6.1. From Denition 2, we
get the following results:
a00
T   g < 0 , b < 0 and  + g   ^ a00
^ T < 0 , ^ b > 0 (55)
Under Assumption 1 and since ^ b < 1, we also have




> 0 , ^ b > 0 (56)












































 + g   ^ a00
^ T

> 0 and T (1) =

a00

















The result is proved.
6.3 KPR utility function
We rst need to prove the existence of a steady state. We get from (43)
g(`) =
cv0( ` `)
v( ` `) = ch( `   `)
Using the fat that c = `, equation (43) can thus be written as
`h( `   `)  ~ g(`) = w0=
If we assume that limL!0( `   L)h(L) = +1 and limL! `( `   L)h(L) = 0,
then we get lim`!0 ~ g(`) = 0, lim`!` ~ g(`) = +1 and ~ g0(`) > 0. It follows
that there exists a unique steady state with x
1 = ` and ` 2 (0;  `).
Normalyzing the steady state with ( `   `)=` =  > 0 gives   = =.
We easily derive that
cc = 1
; `c =   1
1 ; c` = 
(1 ); `` = 








  0 (58)
Proposition 3. Let U(c;L) = [cv(L)]
1  =(1 ) with c and L some normal
goods, b < 0 and ^ b > 0. Then, there exist   =  1=  > 0 and   2 (0;1) such
that when  2 [0;  ), the steady state is locally indeterminate if  2 (0;  ).




































































20with  = =w0 and , w0 given in Appendix 6.1. Assuming b < 0 and
^ b > 0, we rst show that for cc 2 (0;1], i.e.   1, local indeterminacy is
























































It follows that local indeterminacy requires a large enough value of cc = 1=.





 + g   ^ a00
^ T

> 0; T0() =

a00





lim!+1 D0() = 0 
The result is proved.
Remark: Proposition 3 provides a drastically dierent conclusion than
the one obtained within aggregate models. Indeed local indeterminacy is
ruled out under standard parameterizations in one-sector models with KPR
preferences.22 This result is easily explained by the fact that the existence of
multiple equilibria in aggregate models relies on large values for the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption and the elasticity of the labor
supply, but the conditions for concavity prevent these two conditions to
hold simultaneously. However, in two-sector models with constant social
returns, local indeterminacy requires a weakly elastic labor supply which is
compatible with a large intertemporal substitution in consumption.
6.4 GHH utility function
We rst need to prove the existence of a steady state. Let ` =  l 2 (0;  `). We
get
g( l) = G0(( `    l)=B)=B  ~ g(B)
22See Hintermaier [20, 21], Jaimovich [22], Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [29], Pintus
[34].
21If G0(L=B) + (L=B)G00(L=B) 6= 0 then ~ g0(B) 6= 0. Assume also that
G
LL(L=B) > 0 for any L=B > 0, and
i) limx!0 G0(x)x = +1 and limx!+1 G0(x)x = 0,
or
ii) limx!0 G0(x)x = 0 and limx!+1 G0(x)x = +1.23
This implies that there exists a unique value B of B such that when B = B,
 l satises equation (43). It follows that there exists a unique steady state
with x
1 = ` and ` =  l 2 (0;  `).
Using the elasticity of G(L=B) as dened by (33), we get from (14) that















































Note that while 1
cc is clearly positive, 2
cc can be positive or negative.
Proposition 4. Let U(c;L) = u(c+G(L=B)) with B = B, ^ b > 0 and cc =
maxf1
cc;2
ccg. Then, when cc > cc, the steady state is locally indeterminate.















































with  = =w0 and , w0 given in Appendix 6.1. Let b < 0 and ^ b > 0.











cc > 0 (66)
Moreover, when (66) is satised, T < 0 if
23If G(x) = x
1 &=(1   &) with & = 1=
G
LL > 0, i) is satised when & > 1 while ii) holds




















Note that while 1
cc is clearly positive, 2
cc can be positive or negative. The
result is proved taking cc = maxf1
cc;2
ccg > 0.
Note that the bound cc is an increasing function of the elasticity  G
``.
Recalling that `w =  G
``, the lowest value of cc is obtained when the labor





















Remark: Proposition 4 also provides a drastically dierent conclusion
than the one obtained within aggregate models. Local indeterminacy is
indeed completely ruled out in one-sector models with GHH preferences.24
In this case, the absence of income eect implies that an expected increase
in the marginal rate of return on capital does not generate a strong enough
variation of labor supply to be compatible with the Euler equation, and thus
the expectation of a new equilibrium cannot be self-fullling.25 However, in
a two-sector model, an expected increase in the marginal rate of return
on capital generates movements of productive resources across sectors that
modify the marginal product of capital and labor and the relative price of
the investment good. As a result, the Euler equation can be satised even
with variations of the labor supply that remain small, and the expectation
of a new equilibrium can be self- fullling.
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